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In March 2015, the Polish Academy of science, the Institute of Law studies, and 
the Centre for Polish-russian dialogue held a conference entitled The Case of Crimea 
in the Light of International Law: Its Nature and Implications. the conference took place 
against the backdrop of the first anniversary of Crimea’s ‘annexation’ / ‘reunification’2 
by russia, providing an opportunity for international legal scholars to discuss the 
legality of these events.
over two days, the conference saw around 35 presented papers on issues 
following five general themes: self-determination and secession; use of force, 
aggression and armed attack; the international community’s response to the 
situation in Crimea; non-recognition of unlawful situations; and international state 
and individual responsibility in the case of Crimea.
the invited academics and practitioners who spoke at the conference came from 
Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, France, germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, russia, switzerland, 
the Netherlands, ukraine, uk and usA.
this review will explore selected presentations on the key issues of self-
determination, secession, use of force and state responsibility.
1. Factual Background to the Situation in Crimea
the facts founding the basis for discussion at the conference were those taking 
place in Crimea between February 21, 2014, and March 21, 2014, – the period 
between ukrainian President, Victor yanukovych’s flight from the country and the 
1  the views expressed by the author in this article is her own, and do not reflect the opinion of Threefold 
Legal Advisors LLC or its clients.
2  the term used by russia with respect to the Crimean situation.
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annexation / incorporation of Crimea into the russian Federation. they encompassed 
a motion in the Verkhovna rada to repeal the ukrainian Law No. 5029-VI of July 3, 
2012, ‘on the Principles of state Language Policy’ on February 23, seizure of the 
Crimean Parliament by the then identified3 gunmen on February 27, the seizure of 
simferopol and sevastopol airports on February 28, and the blockade of Balaklava 
harbour from the same day. Panelists also addressed subsequent discussions at the 
uN security Council [hereinafter uNsC] and the imposition of sanctions on russia by 
individual states and international organizations in the course of 2014 and 2015.
Various public statements made about the Crimean situation by the russian 
ambassador to the united Nations, the russian President and russia’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 2014 and 2015 were also addressed, including statements by 
President Putin on March 18 and April 17, 2014, as well as statements by ukraine.
reference was also made to the Maidan period preceding February 21, 2014, by 
a number of russian participants.
2. Legal Background to the Situation
discussion between conference panelists was grounded in a number of bilateral 
and multilateral agreements involving russia and ukraine, as applicable to the 
Crimean situation and its consequences, as well as to applicable rules of customary 
international law and general principles of law.
of the russia / ukraine bilateral agreements referred to, principal focus was 
placed on the 1997 treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership and the 1997 
Agreement on the status and Conditions of the russian Federation Black sea Fleet’s 
stay on ukrainian territory.  
the multilateral agreements invoked by discussants included: the 1945 united 
Nations Charter; the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on security and Cooperation in 
Europe; the Protocol to the Commonwealth Pact, signed in Alma-Ata on december 
21, 1991; and the 1994 Memorandum on security Assurances, signed in Budapest 
between russia, the united kingdom and the united states, entered into in 
connection with ukraine’s accession to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty.
this body of treaty law was mainly invoked by discussants to outline russia’s 
obligations with respect to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence 
of the ukraine. the obligations not to use force were also interpreted in light of 
the 1974 united Nations definition of Aggression (uNgA resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 
december 14, 1974) [hereinafter definition of Aggression].
As part of discussion on the applicable principles of self-determination, panelists 
applied those principles stated in the 1970 united National Friendly relations 
declaration (uNgA resolution 2625 (XXV) of october 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly 
3  Later admitted by President Putin to be russian soldiers in his address dated April 17, 2014.
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relations declaration], addressing their application in state practice and by national 
and international courts and tribunals, as well as their interpretation in international 
legal scholarship.
discussants also relied on russia’s prior legal position on the issues of territorial 
integrity and self-determination, in particular, its written and oral pleadings in the 
kosovo proceedings at the International Court of Justice [hereinafter ICJ] in 2009.
3. Self-Determination, Secession and Use of Force
the central question to feature in most presentations4 was whether the use of 
military force in Crimea took the issue of the peninsula’s lawful self-determination 
off the table in its entirety under international law. however, the grounds for self-
determination were also discussed in detail.
Panelists generally agreed that in order to receive the right to secede from 
a parent state, the population of a given territory must qualify as a self-determined 
unit – that is, a people. here, it was felt whilst there are a variety of definitions of 
a ‘people,’ none are likely to be applicable to the Crimean population.
As state practice and opinio juris play a crucial role in the formation of international 
law, Chris Borgen (St. John’s University, New York, USA) drew attention to the fact that 
in the 2009 kosovo proceedings before the ICJ russia had expressed a position on 
the definition of the ‘will of the people’ that was in clear contradiction of its current 
position on Crimea. In the kosovo proceedings, russia had specifically stated that
the words ‘the will of the people’ do not necessarily refer to the population 
of kosovo only and could very well encompass the whole population of 
the country concerned, or else reflect the general notion of ‘popular will’ as 
a principle of democracy.5
In practical terms, if applied to the situation in Crimea, this earlier russian reading 
of international law would have required the holding of a ukrainian-wide referendum 
on Crimea’s secession.
Alexander Zadorozhny (Taras Shevchenko University, Kyiv, Ukraine) questioned the 
consistency of russia’s position on self-determination, citing russia’s Constitutional 
Court in rulings No. 10-P of June 7, 2000, and No. 92-o of June 27, 2000. under these 
rulings, peoples residing in certain russian regions do not enjoy the right of external 
self-determination. Professor Zadorozhny also noted that for 23 years Crimea had 
enjoyed broad autonomy within the ukraine, and was thus granted internal self-
4  with the exception of Professor tolstykh (Novosibirsk state university, russia), who took the official 
russian position concerning the legality of russia’s intervention in the Crimea due to the danger 
presented by the Maidan revolution.
5  ICJ Verbatim record, Cr 2009/30, at 43 (dec. 8, 2009), at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15726.
pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
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determination. No discussion on broadening such internal self-determination had 
occurred prior to proceeding with external self-determination, though there had 
been no obstacles to engaging in such dialogue. Professor Zadorozhny also critically 
assessed the argument made by russian commentators that after the Maidan Crimea 
had been ‘excluded from ukrainian national dialogue,’ noting that no Crimean had 
been excluded from the Verkhovna rada by the time of Crimea’s separation.
Theodore Christakis (University of Grenoble, France) prefaced his speech with an 
introductory remark about prior flagrant international law violations by western 
states, highlighting that this did not, however, entitle subsequent violations of 
international law by russia. he proceeded to give a very insightful presentation on 
whether a positive right to external self-determination exists under international law 
outside the colonial context. the self-determination principle was first introduced into 
international law through the uN Charter in 1945, and, as far as the united Nations 
is concerned, it has always applied solely to the process of decolonization. Professor 
Christakis also addressed the self-determination paradox by which secession is 
neither prohibited nor permitted as such, though the principle of territorial integrity 
creates a strong presumption in international law against secession, in favour of the 
home state. this absence of any prohibition is reflected, inter alia, in the often-quoted 
passage of the ICJ in the kosovo Advisory opinion that ‘general international law 
contains no . . . prohibition of the declarations of independence.’6 however, it does 
not automatically give rise to an enforceable right to secede.
As regards remedial secession, both Christakis and Borgen agreed that lack of 
consistent state practice and the radically different opinio juris of states, mean that no 
right to remedial secession has thus far emerged under positive international law.
the absence of both a prohibition or permission on secession under international 
law does not mean that the ‘effective’ secession of Crimea is allowed under 
international law, given russia’s armed involvement in the conflict. Professor Christakis 
particularly noted russia’s main argument, which has evolved to support the use of 
force to guarantee the exercise of self-determination. while holding a referendum as 
such is not a violation of international law, external intervention to pursue to holding 
of such a referendum is. the Friendly relations declaration allows the promotion 
of the right to self-determination. here, people fighting for self-determination are 
allowed ‘to seek and to receive support’ only in accordance with the provisions of 
the uN Charter, which includes provisions on the prohibition of the use of force. 
Furthermore, according to the Friendly relations declaration support may be sought 
and received against a forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-
determination, which makes this provision essentially inapplicable to Crimea.
during the second panel discussion on the use of force, panelists held a legal 
discussion on the official russian position on this matter, as reflected, inter alia, in the 
6  Advisory opinion, Accordance with International Law of the unilateral declaration of Independence 
in respect of kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 438, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.
pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
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statement by President Putin of March 18, 2014, where it was asserted that ‘without 
a single shot being fired and without casualties, there has not been an aggression.’7 
the russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs went even further than this8 to state that, as 
no shots had been fired, the use of force had not taken place at all.
on the latter point, Patrycja Grzebyk (University of Warsaw, Poland) and Antonello 
Tancredi (University of Palermo, Italy) noted that under international law aggression 
can occur both against people and territory, as well as sovereign rights. thus, even in 
the absence of any loss of life or massive destruction, a military operation resulting 
in the forcible taking of another state’s territory amounts to aggression.
Panelists also highlighted that common Art. 2 of the geneva Conventions defines 
as an international armed conflict situations excluding military resistance. Paul 
Eden (University of Sussex, United Kingdom) pointed out that the russian Federation 
Council’s authorization of the use of armed force in the ukraine amounts to a threat 
of the use of force.
Christian Henderson (University of Liverpool, United Kingdom) discussed a ‘cascading 
relationship’ between coercion that went through political, economic, military, etc. 
intervention and various forms9 of the use of force, of which an armed attack is the gravest. 
the legal qualification of certain actions as an ‘armed attack’ gives an attacked state the 
right of self-defense, which in the case of Crimea was never used by ukraine.10
In the Crimean context, the language employed by ukraine and at the uNsC was 
that of ‘aggression.’ Antonello tancredi noted a degree of confusion to the extent 
that claims were based on ‘aggression,’ rather than the ‘armed attack’ that would 
allow the ukraine to claim its right of self-defense. Patrycja grzebyk cited scholarship 
according to which in referring to ‘aggression’ the definition of Aggression defines 
various forms of an armed attack. she referred to the fact that, for example, invasion 
(para. 3(a) of the definition of Aggression or armed blockade of the ports or coasts 
(para. 3(c) of the definition of Aggression) do constitute an armed attack sufficient 
to trigger the right to self-defense.
At the same time, the panel generally agreed that qualifying russia’s actions as 
‘aggression’ may be even more significant in the circumstances in light of the fact 
that it would give rise to the application of Art. 5 of the definition of Aggression, 
7  Address by President of the Russian Federation, President of russia (Mar. 18, 2014), <http://en.kremlin.
ru/events/president/news/20603> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
8  Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich Answers a Media Question about the Situation around 
the Budapest Memorandum, <http://www.mid.ru/BdoMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/CC1C845CAA26d5A043257
E07004BF6EB?opendocument> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
9  An armed attack within the meaning of Art. 51 of the uN Charter or an act of aggression within the 
meaning of the definition of Aggression.
10  the right of self-defense was mentioned by ukraine only once, in the address of the ukrainian 
parliament to the united Nations of March 13, 2014, where russia’s actions, however, were called an 
‘unprovoked act of aggression.’ however, in practice ukraine did not invoke the right of self-defense 
in response to the taking of the Crimea. An ‘armed attack’ was not discussed at all either at the uNsC 
or elsewhere with respect to the Crimean situation.
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which prohibits any territorial acquisitions or special advantages resulting from 
aggression. In addressing the customary nature of this provision, some panelists 
referred to the Nuremberg judgment under which the annexations of Czechoslovakia 
and Austria were considered acts of aggression.
the official russian position was presented by Evgeny Voronin (MGIMO University, 
Moscow, Russia). he posited that russia had the right to deploy military personnel in 
Crimea under the 1997 Agreement between the russian Federation and ukraine on 
the status and Conditions of the russian Federation Black sea Fleet’s stay on ukrainian 
territory, pointing out that the number of troops permitted under that Agreement 
were in no case exceeded in 2014. unfortunately, this position failed to address 
russia’s obligation not to use its military personnel to violate ukrainian territorial 
sovereignty and political independence under Art. 6(1) of that Agreement.
Additionally, Professor Voronin, together with another speaker from russia – 
Alexander Salenko (Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, Russia) – argued 
that due to the illegality of the transfer of Crimea in 1954, and the lack of a referendum 
in 1991 when Crimea became part of the ukraine, an unlawful situation has emerged 
in which the ukraine had not secured legal title to Crimea. however, this line of 
argumentation seems to forget that according to the russian position expressed before 
the ICJ in its oral submissions in 2009,11 lack of discussion on the status of a territory 
during a country’s disintegration, such as happened in sFry in 1992 or the ussr in 1991, 
breaks the link between subsequent secession and the initial process of dissolution.
Professor Voronin supported his arguments with reference to the reunification 
of Northern schleswig with denmark in 1921 through plebiscite. Nevertheless, that 
situation of almost 100 years ago involved extensive negotiations and at least a two-
year preparation – a backdrop dramatically different from the Crimean referendum, 
which was announced and held within less than three weeks.
the general conclusion of the first two panels was that, notwithstanding any 
possible arguments in favour of self-determination under international law and while 
the holding of a referendum as such is not a violation of international law, external 
military intervention in support of a referendum is a grave violation of preemptory 
norms of international law and should entail state and individual responsibility.
4. Responsibility and Sanctions
sanctions imposed on russia are the practical implementation of state respon-
sibility as codified by the International Law Commission [hereinafter ILC] in its draft 
Articles on responsibility of states for Internationally wrongful Acts12 [hereinafter 
draft Articles].
11  See supra n. 5.
12  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in report of the International 
Law Commission, u.N. gAor, 53rd sess., supp. No. 10, u.N. doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in 2 y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 20 (2001), u.N. doc. A/CN.4/sEr.A/2001/Add.1, at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
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Anatoly Kapustin (Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law, Moscow, 
Russia) asserted that sanctions can only be lawful when imposed within the 
framework of an international organization. however, this view does not find support 
in either state practice or the draft Articles – a point highlighted by other participants 
of the panel. Furthermore, neither is the argument consistent with russia’s approach 
with respect to georgia when in 2006, russia unilaterally imposed bans on the import 
of certain georgian goods into russia, and interrupted all aerial, road, maritime, 
railway, postal and financial links with georgia13 – a matter not addressed in Professor 
kapustin’s presentation.
In the current state of international law, there is an open question as to whether 
and to what extent non-recognition is mandatory. however, the right not to recognize 
a situation in case of its illegality is not disputed.
According to the draft Articles, state responsibility arises in the case of an inter-
national wrongful act committed by a state. In the event that such an act concerns 
obligations erga omnes – obligations owed to the international community as a whole – 
the responsibility of such a state can be invoked not only by the immediate victim 
state, but also by other states, either acting individually or through international 
organizations.
According to Professor kapustin’s view, votes on resolution 68/262 in the uN 
general Assembly show that the international community ‘as a whole’ had not 
recognized reunification of Crimea as illegal.
Enrico Milano (University of Verona, Italy) noted that while the international 
community does not have a lawfully delegated authority to decide on a situation with 
legally binding effect (beyond the uNsC, which can be blocked from determining 
legality and imposing measures by the permanent member veto), each state must 
decide whether a violation of an erga omnes obligation has occurred.
Maurizio Arcari (University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy) alluded to the relevant 
provisions of the draft Articles. under Art. 41, states have certain obligations in the 
event of a breach of an obligation erga omnes. these include cooperating to bring 
to an end the breach through lawful means, non-recognition as lawful of a situation 
entailing such a breach, and not rendering any aid or assistance to maintain that 
situation. In addition, states are entitled under Art. 48 to invoke the responsibility 
of the state committing the violation of a ius cogens norm by claiming from the 
responsible state cessation of the internationally wrongful act, as well as assurances 
and guarantees of non-repetition; and performance of the obligation of reparation 
in the interest of the injured state or the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. 
Moreover, by using the language of ‘lawful measures’ Art. 54 covers both retortions 
(generally lawful measures under international law) and counter-measures (measures 
that are contrary to international law but that can be justified when taken in response 
13  Georgia v. Russia, ¶ 22, no. 13255/07 (Eur. Ct. h.r., Jul. 3, 2014), at <http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2014/
EChr-gEorgIAv.russIA-I.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
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to the violation).14 however, the ILC noted in 2001 that state practice was too sparse 
to establish a rule of general application with respect to counter-measures taken in 
the general or collective interest of the international community as a whole.
speakers noted the consistent invocation of the general interest of the 
international community and significant practice regarding the non-recognition 
of Crimea’s annexation by countries and international organizations, like the osCE, 
Eu and NAto. they concluded that this is likely to add to the development of 
international law in the area of collective counter-measures – a question hereto 
left unresolved by the ILC.
speakers agreed that any economic sanctions, as measures to applied by a state 
or a group of states to achieve changes in the internal or foreign policy of another 
country, come into tension with wto law, the primary purpose of which is to 
liberalize international trade. however, the so-called security exception in Art. XXI15 
of the gAtt and similar gAts and trIPs provisions potentially prevent any legal 
conflicts in this area. Indeed, Łukasz Gruszczyński (Institute of Law Studies of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland) and Matthias Hartwig (Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany) surmised that, if 
assessed by a wto panel, the application of, would mean that such sanctions would 
be unlikely to be found in violation of wto law.
5. Non-Recognition
A separate panel of the conference was devoted to non-recognition as a legal 
obligation stemming from Art. 41 of the draft Articles.
the discussion proceeded with a very detailed account of the particular measures 
that should be adopted by states as the consequence of their non-recognition policy 
with regard to the Crimean situation.
Among such measures is the ban on imports of goods originating from Crimea and 
not certified by ukrainian authorities (such as Council regulation (Eu) No. 692/2014 
of June 23, 2014) – a typical measure that has also been applied, inter alia, with 
regard to Northern Cyprus, transnistria, and other regions with contested status. 
As part of non-recognition policy, states are not supposed to recognize the current 
Crimean authorities. Przemysław Saganek (Institute of Law Studies of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland) added in this regard, that according to Polish 
law, judgments of russian courts based in Crimea will not be recognized in Poland. 
Furthermore, states are not supposed to enter into agreements with russia that 
14  According to professor Arcari, the third phase of sanctions against russia in december 2014 fell under 
the framework of counter-measures.
15  Prohibiting to ‘prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests . . . (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency 
in international relations . . .’
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implicitly recognize russia’s sovereignty over Crimea (with one humanitarian 
exception). such consequences of non-recognition were discussed by the ICJ in its 
1971 Advisory opinion on Legal Consequences for states of the Continued Presence 
of south Africa in Namibia (south west Africa).
According to Stefan Oeter (University of Hamburg, Germany), in practical terms, 
this duty means an absence of any demarcation treaties, including on exclusive 
economic zones [hereinafter EEZ], and in particular, no joint exploitation agreements 
with respect to the Black sea territory adjacent to Crimea and claimed by russia. 
It also means the non-applicability of treaties with relevant territorial clauses of 
application, such as double taxation treaties, extradition or investment treaties, 
etc. In particular, a foreign investor may not rely on investment protection if doing 
business in the occupied territories, as it is not an investment in the territory of the 
state concerned. In the latter case, even if an investment tribunal accepts the case 
for consideration and delivers an award in favour of the investor, states adhering to 
non-recognition policy would not be allowed to enforce such a ruling as it would 
imply recognition of the contested territory. under the uN Convention on the Law 
of the sea, russia is not recognized as a coastal state and, as a result, cannot enjoy 
the rights of a coastal state, such as the right to arrest or inspect vessels or crew, 
exploit resources of the EEZ, etc.
however, according to the established humanitarian exception rule, certain 
actions with respect to contested territories are allowed to benefit their populations, 
without entailing recognition of such territories. For example, under the ICJ’s 1971 
Namibia Advisory opinion and the European Court of human rights case of Louizidou 
v. Turkey,16 certain transactions and acts by third states, such as the registration of 
various civic acts (marriages, births and deaths), without which the inhabitants of 
the territory would be negatively affected, are lawful and not treated as recognition 
of such contested territories.
6. Conclusion
the situation in Crimea is highly challenging, and a legal solution is almost 
impossible without the mobilization of further political will. As noted during the 
panels, similar situations have occurred in the past, in localities such as Northern 
Cyprus, south rhodesia, Palestine, etc. such situations have always inhered 
enormous tension between facts and law, wherein a de facto situation remains 
legally unrecognized. this is not the first time a permanent five uN security Council 
16  See, e.g.: Advisory opinion, Legal Consequences for states of the Continued Presence of south Africa 
in Namibia (south west Africa) notwithstanding security Council resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 
56, at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/53/5595.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015); Loizidou v. Turkey, 
¶ 45, no. 15318/89 (Eur. Ct. h.r., dec. 18, 1996), at <http://www.hri.org/news/special/loizidou/onmerits.
html> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
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member has been involved in a military operation that has not been authorized by 
the uNsC itself. As always, the direct involvement of such a member – this time, 
russia – undoubtedly adds to the gravity of the situation.
one of the most notable aspects of the warsaw Conference was a complete 
breakdown in effective communication between speakers from russian universities 
and those from other localities. Although everyone spoke about international law 
and seemingly interpreted the same applicable treaties, russian argumentation 
structures appeared to be based on entirely different premises to those of the rest 
of the audience. Also notably, the presentations made by the four russian speakers 
were mostly limited to presenting the official russian position on the Crimean 
situation, often restating it to the letter. In so doing, some of the speakers from 
russia did not perceive a problem with russia applying an entirely different reading 
of particular rules of international law. 
whilst this stance may in some way prove to be of utility to russia in the context 
of a conference or any other scientific event, it would definitely be a losing strategy 
before an international court.
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